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This article examines the effects of infl ation targeting (IT) policy on infl ation and output perform-
ance. I employ the propensity score matching method for the sample of CEE countries from 1990 
to 2010. The evidence suggests that the IT regime does not have a signifi cant effect on the infl ation 
level or the infl ation volatility; however, the IT framework can help to increase GDP per capita. 
The effects on infl ation indicators are inconsistent with previous studies. The results are robust to 
different methodologies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Inflation targeting (IT), as a monetary policy framework, has become popular 
since the early 1990s. The number of countries that have adopted IT is growing. 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2010), there were 28 such coun-
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tries. In addition, a large number of other developed and developing countries 
are considering a move in this direction (e.g., USA, Japan, and India). Based on 
the study by Mishkin – Savastano (2001), the IT framework provides a public 
announcement of a specific numerical inflation target, which is a strong commit-
ment by the monetary authority to price stability as well as to high accountability 
and to a high degree of transparency. According to Svensson (1997), the most im-
portant feature for IT is a “forward-looking decision-making procedure”, which 
is called “inflation-forecast targeting”.
Since New Zealand first implemented an IT regime, its advantages and dis-
advantages continue to be debated in the economic literature (Roger 2009). 
Gonçalves – Salles (2008) employ cross-section difference-in-difference OLS 
methods developed by Ball – Sheridan (2005) to test IT effects on inflation as 
well as on output growth in 36 developing countries. They claim that IT countries 
have a better performance in lowering the inflation level as well as output growth 
than in non-IT economies. In accordance with the study of Gonçalves – Salles 
(2008), Batini – Laxton (2006) provide better results by employing the same 
cross-section difference-in-difference OLS methods: IT not only helps to lower 
the inflation level and output growth volatility, but also helps to lower inflation 
volatility.1 Lin – Ye (2009) evaluated 13 developing countries by employing pro-
pensity score matching methods to show that IT has a significant effect on lower-
ing the inflation level as well as inflation volatility. Fraga et al. (2003) – by using 
Brazil as an example – also argue that IT has been successful in developing coun-
tries. In accordance with the study of Fraga et al. (2003), Ito – Hayashi (2004) 
compared IT regimes in four Asian countries and argue that the introduction of IT 
helps to form a sound monetary policy framework and increases accountability 
and policy transparency.
By contrast, Taguchi – Kato (2011) found negative impacts. They claim that 
the difficulty that emerging countries encounter is how to manage the exchange 
rate impacted by the external debt denominated in US dollars. In theory, IT can 
be implemented in a floating exchange rate environment. However, Calvo – Re-
inhart (2002) argue that developing countries have a “fear of floating”, which 
means that they fear the credibility of their own currency. The developing coun-
tries’ focus on exchange rate volatility restrains them from adopting an IT policy 
at the first step. As such, small and open economies encounter more fluctuations 
in exchange rates through the “pass-through” effect, which interferes with the 
monetary authority’s ability to control the inflation level and to implement IT.
Another problem, as Taguchi – Kato (2011) suggest, is that developing econo-
mies lack credibility for inflation targeting, which may originate from insufficient 
1 Brito – Bystedt (2010) found the same for output growth.
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independence of the monetary authority, economic volatility, or less precise infla-
tion forecasting ability. Hence, if agents do not believe that the monetary author-
ity has the ability to make IT successful, the effect of IT on the behaviour and 
expectations of the private sector regarding pricing or wage contracts is limited 
to enervate the strength of IT.
In addition, formal empirical evidence on the IT treatment effect in developed 
countries is criticised by Gonçalves – Salles (2008), who note that such studies 
may be plagued with selection bias. On the empirical front, it is not surprising 
that developed countries that adopted an IT regime did not demonstrate economic 
gains because such countries either did not suffer serious inflation problems or 
their macroeconomic condition was stable initially. Hence, insignificant econom-
ic gains have been observed. However, it may remain possible to provide benefits 
to emerging nations that experience larger shocks as well as difficulties in design-
ing effective macroeconomic policies.
The purpose of this paper is to test the IT policy performance by employing 
specific examples of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. This paper is 
based on Taguchi – Kato (2011), Novák (2014) and Lin – Ye (2009) works. This 
paper extends the study of European economies conducted by Novák (2014), 
who examined the exchange and monetary policy framework for Central and 
Southern European emerging countries; this paper focuses on the inflation target-
ing policy in CEE emerging and developed economies. The sample afforded the 
flexibility to use or interpret the results reliably from average treatment effect on 
treated (ATT) for testing IT policy effects on prices. Second, the sample in this 
study is much more related to recent periods. Lin – Ye (2009) employed the data 
from the year 1985 to the year 2005, whereas I extend the periods to the year 
2010. Moreover, Lin – Ye (2009) examined the sample through the end of 2004, 
when most CEE countries had not adopted an IT policy. Such relatively recent 
periods enable the examination of the financial crisis regarding the IT policy per-
formance in the CEE countries. Third, according to Ball – Sheridan (2005), most 
previous studies ignore the self-selection problem for policy adoption, and such 
activity leads to biased estimation results.2 More specifically, previous studies 
employ a difference-in-difference approach (e.g. Neumann – Hagen 2002), and 
they find a significant decrease in the mean and variance of the inflation level. 
Nevertheless, their studies ignored the potential problem of endogeneity, which 
means that the initial inflation level impacted the decision to adopt IT. Thereafter, 
as Ball – Sheridan (2005) suggested, a study that does not examine the countries’ 
initial condition is more likely to have biased results. Hence, this paper employs 
propensity score matching techniques to control for the self-selection problem, 
2 Refer to Dehejia – Wahba (2002) and Heckman et al. (1997) for detailed discussions. 
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which examines whether macroeconomic factors such as lagged inflation level, 
lagged GDP growth rate, money growth, trade to GDP ratio, debt to GDP ratio 
and IT adoption in neighbouring countries have an impact on the countries’ de-
cision to adopt IT.3 Thus, this study improves the literature by Taguchi – Kato 
(2011) on examining IT and its influence on the inflation volatility or the inflation 
level. Fourth, regarding the effects of an IT regime, I simultaneously examine the 
output indicator (GDP per capita) in addition to inflation indicators, as suggested 
by Brito – Bystedt (2010).
My findings suggest that the average treatment effect regarding economic 
output is significant and large within inflation targeting countries. However, in-
consistent with previous studies, IT has no significant effects on the inflation 
level and inflation volatility4 in CEE countries. Generally, compared with non-
IT countries, an IT regime helps to increase GDP per capita. In addition, I test 
whether an IT regime works in financial crisis periods (2007–2010 in this study). 
The evidence shows that even in financial crisis periods, inflation targeting works 
well with respect to GDP per capita in IT countries.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
data and method used. Section 3 provides the empirical results and discussions. 
Section 4 describes the robustness tests and extended analysis, and compares 
these with the propensity score matching method. Section 5 summarises and con-
cludes.
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHOD
This study covers 16 economies in the CEE area from 1990 to 2010. Most of the 
data stems from the IMF World Economic Outlook Databases (WEO) and the 
World Bank’s Economic Policy & External Debt database. The information on 
inflation targeting in CEE countries is obtained from the IMF website and the 
National Bank of Slovakia. In accordance with Ball – Sheridan (2005) and Lin 
– Ye (2007), I contend that inflation targeting starts to have an effect in the first 
year after a country has adopted IT. The starting year for each individual IT coun-
try is obtained from Roger (2010) and IMF adjustments. The inflation targeters 
3  According to Mendonça – de Guimarães (2012), the propensity matching score is by far the 
best fitted methodology available in the literature to examine the treatment effect of an IT 
regime. The idea of control variable “IT adoption in neighbouring countries” is that a country 
is more likely to adopt the IT policy regime if a neighbour country has already implemented 
the IT framework each year.
4  Measured by the consumer price index (CPI). Inflation volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation for the moving average of the inflation level (CPI) in the next three years.
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and their IT adoption years are: Czech Republic (1997), Poland (1998), Hungary 
(2001), Romania (2005), Serbia (2006), Slovakia (2005), and Albania (2009). 
The non-inflation targeters are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Esto-
nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia.
2.1. Treatment effect and selection bias
The objective of the paper is to test and compare the average treatment effect be-
tween IT countries and non-IT nations. Hence, to test the ATT (average treatment 
effect on the treated group), the following equation is employed:
  (1)
where D is a dummy variable (if a country adopts IT, D equals 1, otherwise D is 
0), Y is the outcome (inflation level, inflation volatility, and GDP per capita, in 
this case), 0 1i iY D  denotes the result if an inflation targeting country has not 
implemented an IT policy, 1 1i iY D  and  is the outcome observed in reality 
for the same country that adopted IT. The difficulty is that the second item on 
the right hand side of the equation is not observable because it is not possible to 
observe the outcome in a targeting country that has not adopted IT. If inflation 
targeting is randomly adopted, we can calculate the average treatment effect eas-
ily by comparing the mean in the treatment group (in this case, IT countries are 
in the treatment group) with that in the control group (non-IT countries in this 
case). But biased results will be observed if targeting policy adoption is not ran-
domly selected. According to Dehejia – Wahba (2002), if observable variables, 
which are correlated with inflation targeting adoption, also impact the outcomes, 
a selection of observable variable problems will be raised; as such, the traditional 
linear regression models are unreliable.
2.2. Propensity score matching methods
According to Dehejia – Wahba (2002), propensity score matching techniques 
should be implemented to solve the problem of the “selection of unobserved 
observations”. To conduct the test, it is important to conduct a randomised ex-
periment with a control group, and then to compare the results with a treatment 
group. The assumption (which is called the unconfoundedness hypothesis) need-
ed for the propensity score matching method is to make outcomes independent 
1 0[ 1] [ 1]i i i iATT E Y D E Y D   
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with the IT dummy variable, given a condition on 0 1( , )Y Y D X .5 According 
to Heckman et al. (1997), to estimate ATT, we can use a weaker assumption of 
mean independence:6
0 0 0[ 1, ] [ 0, ] [ ]i i i i i i i iE Y D X E Y D X E Y X    , which requires the out-
comes (inflation level and inflation variability) to be independent of inflation 
targeting adoption. Hence, equation (1) can be expressed as:
  (2)
Hereafter, the second term on the right is observable.
 According to equation (2), one can use the matching method to match the 
treated group with the control group for similar values of X. However, when the 
number of covariates in X increases, this method becomes difficult to conduct 
in practice. To solve such a high volume problem, Rosenbaum – Rubin (1983) 
proposed a method in which one can match the treated group with control groups 
on their propensity scores (in this case, the probability for policy adoption with 
conditioning on X), which can be estimated by probit or logit models (in this pa-
per, I employ the logit model). According to Heckman et al. (1997), to make the 
equation well-defined simultaneously for all X, it is usually assumed that 0 < P(X) 
< 1; this requires the existence of both comparable treated units for each control 
unit and comparable control units for each treated unit. The proofs are shown in 
their paper.
Hence, with the propensity matching score method, equation (2) can be rewrit-
ten as:
  (3)
Although the propensity matching score is the best fitted methodology avail-
able in the literature thus far to examine the treatment effect of an IT regime 
(Mendonça – de Guimarães 2012), and many empirical studies employed PSM 
to examine the treatment effect for inflation targeting (e.g., Lin – Ye 2007, 2009), 
there remain certain common disadvantages, namely an unconfoundedness hy-
pothesis problem. That is, the unconfoundedness hypothesis, which assumes 
5  According to Lin – Ye (2007), under the conditional independence assumption, the average 
treatment effect (ATE) equals the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
6  A weaker assumption means we assume that Y(i0) is independent with D, compared with a 
stronger assumption that both Y(i0) and Y(i1) are independent with D.
1 0[ 1, ] [ 0, ].i i i i i iATT E Y D X E Y D X   
1 0[ 1, ( )] [ 0, ( )].i i i i i iATT E Y D p X E Y D p X   
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0 1( , )Y Y D X , cannot be tested in practice. This remains a task for future re-
search.
According to Heckman et al. (1997), four different methods of propensity 
score matching will be used in this study: nearest neighbour matching, radius 
matching, kernel matching, and stratification matching. These are explained by 
Becker – Ichino (2002).
3. EMPIRICAL TESTS FOR AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS
This section examines the IT regimes’ average treatment effects on the level of 
inflation, which is measured by the consumer price index (CPI), the inflation 
volatility, which is the standard deviation for the moving average of inflation over 
the next three years, and the GDP per capita (Figure 1). Average inflation level 
is calculated for IT and non-IT countries separately for each year. For example, 
in 1997, the average inflation level for IT countries is the mean of CPI for all IT 
countries in 1997. In 1997, the average inflation level for non-IT countries is the 
mean of CPI for all non-IT countries in 1997. A similar method applies to the 
average inflation volatility and the GDP per capita. Clear, similar trends for the 
average inflation level, the average inflation volatility, and the average GDP per 
capita are shown in the figure for both IT and non-IT countries. Hence, previous 
studies (i.e., Taguchi – Kato 2011) argue that the significant difference before and 
after adopting an IT policy may imply a wrong conclusion regarding an inflation 
targeting effect. For example, during the 1998 to 2001 period, we can observe 
a significant reduction trend for inflation volatility in the IT group when many 
CEE countries began to adopt an IT regime; however, such a decreasing trend 
may not be caused by the newly adopted IT regime, but instead be caused by cer-
tain common factors, which have an impact on both targeting and non-targeting 
countries.
3.1. Empirical estimation of the propensity scores
To examine the propensity scores, a logit model is chosen in which the dependent 
variable is a dummy (for inflation targeting countries, the dummy equals 1, and 
for countries never experiencing an inflation targeting framework, the dummy 
equals 0). Based on the previous literature regarding IT adoption choices (for 
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example , Mishkin 2004),7 I employ three independent variables of interest: money 
growth (measured as the average annual growth rate in money and quasi-money, 
which is expected to negatively correlate with IT adoption), the lagged inflation 
level (the CPI level in the previous year, which is expected to positively correlate 
with IT adoption), and the lagged GDP growth rate (the GDP growth rate in the 
previous year, which is expected to positively relate with an IT framework adop-
tion). Other variables are employed in the model to control for the open status of 
7  The goal of the propensity score matching is not to find a perfect model to explain the prob-
ability of IT adoption. Because of the conditional independence assumption, the exclusion 
of some variables which systematically impact on IT adoption, but not on the inflation level 
(or GDP per capita results) will not harm the tests. Instead, it will help the unconfoundedness 
hypothesis assumption to be satisfied. For more details, see Lin – Ye (2007).
Figure 1. Average inflation level, average inflation volatility, and average GDP per capita in IT 
and non-IT countries
INFLATION TARGETING IN CEE COUNTRIES 383
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
the country (measured by the trade to GDP ratio, which is expected to positively 
relate to IT regime adoption), the natural log of the population of the country 
(which is expected to be positively related with IT adoption), the debt to GDP 
ratio (which is expected to be positively related with IT adoption) as well as the 
IT adoption dummy for the neighbouring country (the dummy equals 1 if a neigh-
bouring country has previously adopted the IT regime in a given year, otherwise 
it equals 0, which is expected to be positively correlated with IT adoption). The 
logit regression model results are reported in Table 1, where each control variable 
in the model is explained above.
Although most coefficients estimated from the model are not significant ac-
cording to the t-test at the 5% significance level, all of the signs of the coefficients 
are consistent with expectations, and the natural log of population is found to be 
significant and positively related to IT adoption (at the 1% level). This is an inter-
esting result that previous studies did not display. The coefficient (4.479) implies 
that for an increase in one unit of the natural log of population, the odds (p/(1–p) 
will increase 88.146, where p is the probability that the country will adopt an 
IT policy. The Broad Money factor as well as the openness (trade to GDP ratio) 
factor are found to be insignificantly correlated to the IT policy (at the 5% sig-
Table 1. Propensity scores estimated by the logit model
Baseline 
model
No hyper-
inflation Post-2000 
Financial 
crisis
Adding 
DEBTGDP
Adding 
Neighbour-
IT-Adop-
tion
model sample sample model model
Lag Inflation 0.017 0.017 –0.006 –0.058 0.012 –0.002
Lag GDP 
growth 0.101 0.101 0.054 0.062 0.096 0.095
Money growth –0.031 –0.031 –0.028 –0.012 –0.032 –0.045
Open 0.013 0.013 0.008 –0.007 0.007 0.014
Ln Population 4.479*** 4.468*** 4.018*** 3.905*** 4.317*** 5.077***
DEBTGDP 0.038
Neighbour-IT-
Adoption 1.58
Constant –11.363*** –11.39*** –7.454** –0.017 –11.232*** –11.326***
No. of 
observations 174 166 126 56 150 168
Pseudo R2 0.69 0.68 0.65 0.6 0.7 0.68
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy. If a country adopts IT in a given year, the dummy equals 1 for the 
observation in that given year. If a country never adopts IT, the country is in the control group and the dummy 
equals 0. The “No hyperinflation model” excludes the observation experiencing a serious hyperinflation prob-
lem with annual inflation rates of more than 50%. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively.
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nificance level), which is different from previous studies (I find that the pseudo-
R-square is approximately 0.69, which is much higher than the 0.22 in Lin – Ye 
2007). The evidence shows that except for the population factor, virtually none of 
the macroeconomic conditions of a country determine whether a central bank will 
choose to adopt the IT framework within the CEE area.
The estimation results for additional robustness tests are explained in the “Ro-
bustness Checks” section.
3.2. Empirical estimating for the matching results
The results for treatment effects estimated by the propensity score matching 
method are illustrated in Tables 2, 3 and 4, which reflect ATT on the inflation 
level, the inflation volatility, and GDP per capita, respectively.
In each table, the first column reports nearest neighbour matching results. 
Then, in the next three columns, I report the radius matching results with a radius 
of 0.01, 0.02, and 0.03, respectively. In the last two columns, I report the results 
of kernel matching and stratification matching.
Table 2 shows that in the baseline model, the average treatment effect of infla-
tion targeting on the inflation level estimated by the four matching methods is on 
average 6.5 lower for treatment group observations, which means that the CPI is 
(on average) 6.5 lower in IT countries compared with that in non-IT countries. 
However, such effects are not significant, even at the 10% significance level. 
The evidence shows that the IT framework does not work well on reducing (or 
increasing) inflation level, which is at variance with previous studies on emerging 
or developed economies.
The baseline in Table 3 illustrates that the average treatment effect of IT on 
inflation volatility estimated by different matching techniques is –1.241, which 
means that the standard deviation of CPI in the next three years is 1.241 lower in 
IT countries compared with their peers without IT policy. Hence, it appears that 
IT can help to decrease the inflation volatility; however, such an effect is found to 
not be as significant as other previous literature suggested.
Table 4 provides estimation results for the treatment effects of an IT regime on 
GDP per capita. The results show that the treatment effects for GDP per capita 
are relatively positive and significant for the kernel matching method (significant 
at the 5% level) and the stratification matching method (significant at the 1% 
level). The average treatment effect estimated by the four matching methods is 
2,143.236, which means that on average, if a country adopts an IT framework, 
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Table 2. Estimates of the treatment effect on inflation level
Matching Methods
Nearest 
neighbour
Radius matching Kernel 
matching
Strati-
fication 
matching 
matching r = 0.01 r = 0.02 r = 0.03
Baseline model –11.934 4.005 –2.853 –3.97 –7.322 –16.936
No hyperinflation 
model –11.698 8.395 –4.920 –6.823 –8.134 –17.598
Post-2000 sample 6.186 2.493 10.698 7.449 2.141 12.128
Financial crisis sample –3.343 –2.717 2.267 0.47 –2.518 –1.692
Adding DEBTGDP 
model –2.211 –7.011 –5.579 –3.775 –1.166 11.386
Adding Neighbour-IT-
Adoption model –12.711 –8.774 –8.229 –9.665 –20.776** –5.656
Notes: The “post-2000 sample” examines the effects for the observations after 2000. The “Financial crisis sam-
ple” investigates the observations between 2007–2010. “Adding DEBTGDP model” is the model with a control 
variable “debt to GDP ratio” added to the baseline model. “Adding Neighbour-IT-Adoption model” is the model 
with a control variable “Neighbour-IT-Adoption” added to the baseline model. The Epanechnikov kernel and 
“0.05” as fixed bandwidth are used for kernel matching. Bootstrapped t-statistics are based on 500 replications 
of the data. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 3. Estimates of the treatment effect on inflation volatility
Matching Methods
Nearest 
neighbour
Radius matching Kernel 
matching
Stratification 
matching
matching r = 0.01 r = 0.02 r = 0.03
Baseline model –1.389 –1.184 –1.207 –2.071 –1.033 –0.562
No hyperinflation episodes –1.338 –0.367 –1.383 –2.078 –0.959 –0.712
Post-2000 sample –0.852 –3.88 –3.138* –2.582 –2.476 –1.14
Financial crisis sample –4.964** –8.869 –3.053 –1.858 –2.403 –2.381
Adding DEBTGDP –1.267 –1.515 –1.075 –1.29 –0.86 –0.56
Adding Neighbour-IT-
Adoption model –0.513 0.488 0.057 –0.236 –0.372 –0.386
Notes: see Table 2.
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this will help the nation to increase GDP per capita by USD 2,143.236 in that 
year. Such significant effects are very noticeable and can be considered by the 
policymakers in the CEE regions.
4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Because certain economies of the covered 16 economies in the CEE area experi-
enced serious hyperinflation problems, with annual inflation rates of more than 
50%, it may be suspected that the results may be driven by such extreme infla-
tion values. Thus, it is necessary to eliminate such hyperinflation units. The new 
results regarding estimated propensity scores are shown in the second column 
in Table 1. The results are similar to those in the first column of the table used 
in Section 3. The coefficients for the lag of inflation, the lag GDP growth rate, 
and the trade to GDP ratio are positive and insignificant, whereas the coefficient 
for money growth is negative and insignificant. The new ATT results when con-
trolling for hyperinflation are illustrated in the second row of Tables 3, 4, and 
5. The new ATT estimated by the four matching method is negative (–6.796) 
but insignificant (even at the 10% significance level) in terms of the inflation 
level. The estimated ATT on inflation variability is approximately –1.14 (by the 
four matching methods); however, the results are insignificant. The average treat-
ment effect on GDP per capita is USD 2,335 (which means that the IT countries 
have USD 2,335 compared with those never experiencing an inflation targeting 
Table 4. Estimates of the treatment effect on output (GDP per capita)
Matching Methods
Nearest 
neighbour
Radius matching Kernel 
matching
Stratification 
matching
matching r = 0.01 r = 0.02 r = 0.03
Baseline model 3,008.584 212.114 2,580.917 2,771.33 3,547.436** 3,149.144***
No hyperinflation 
episodes 2,998.304 1,397.811 2,356.676 2,586.506 3,497.522** 3,182.469***
Post-2000 sample 8,620.33*** –2,363.697 229.075 4,965.26 3,101.458 7,229.499**
Financial crisis 
sample 4,550.691* –8,163.189 –4,234.751 –2,019.24 –3,057.572 –692.282
Adding DEBTGDP 7,112.883*** 43.029 3,770.103 5,502.044* 6,949.195** 6,609.418***
Adding Neighbour-
IT-Adoption model 3,993.567*** 3,910.987* 5,823.599*** 5,326.828*** 5,393.044*** 4,704.188***
Notes: see Table 2.
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policy); the results are significant with the kernel matching method (at the 5% 
significance level) and the stratification matching method (at the 1% significance 
level). Generally, the results on the inflation level and the inflation volatility are 
insignificant, which are at variance with the previous literature. Similarly to the 
baseline model, the ATT of GDP per capita remains positive when controlling for 
hyperinflation problems. All of the results show that the average treatment effects 
are not much influenced by the extreme inflation values within CEE countries.
To check whether the average treatment effect is robust to different time peri-
ods, the post-2000 samples are examined using propensity score matching meth-
ods.8 The results are displayed in column 3 in Table 1 using logit model regres-
sion. The results provide very similar coefficients compared with the above tests; 
solely the coefficient on the natural log of population is significantly positive, 
and the Pseudo R2 is 0.65. The estimation of ATT results on the inflation level, 
the inflation volatility, and the GDP per capita are reported in the third rows of 
Tables 3, 4, and 5. The evidence shows that the ATT on the inflation level is insig-
nificant, whereas the IT effect on inflation volatility is negative. In addition, the 
radius matching method shows a significant (at the 10% level) result (ATT equals 
–3.138) when the radius equals 0.02, which means that the CPI standard devia-
tion for the next three years is 3.138 lower in IT countries compared with non-IT 
countries. However, such significant results do not hold for all other matching 
methods, which imply that this significant result may not be catholic. The ATTs 
for GDP per capita still display positively large and significant results when em-
ploying nearest neighbour matching or stratification matching methods.
The ability of the monetary policy framework to respond effectively to finan-
cial crises and economic downturns, and the optimal form that monetary policy 
framework should take has again become topical since the 2007 financial crisis 
episode. Therefore, my third test is to examine whether the results are robust 
to financial crisis periods.9 The logit model estimating the propensity score is 
displayed in the fourth column in Table 1. The results show that the explanatory 
power has decreased (because the Pseudo R2 decreased to 0.6); solely the natural 
log of population is found to be significant (at the 1% significance level). Ad-
ditionally, the ATT results are reported in the fourth rows in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
However, we can still find coefficient results similar to the above section (which 
8  According to Lin – Ye (2009), the time periods after the year 2000 may have different effects 
compared with the observations before 2000. Hence, it is reasonable to test the results sepa-
rately in different time periods.
 9  Referring to Pathan – Faff (2013), economic outcomes may be different in financial crisis 
periods and thus they need to be examined separately. In this paper, I employ the period from 
2007–2010 as the financial crisis period. 
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means that inflation targeting continues to help to increase GDP per capita, and 
the results on lowering inflation level as well as inflation volatility are insig-
nificant). The exception is the inflation volatility result estimated by the nearest 
neighbour matching method, which is significant at the 5% level (the coefficient 
is –4.964, which means that the standard deviation for CPI in the next three years 
is 4.964 lower compared with non-IT countries). However, such effects disappear 
for all of the other estimation methods; this means that the significant results may 
not be prevalent. Hence, in financial crisis periods, inflation targeting still works 
with respect to GDP per capita with nearest neighbor matching method.
Last, I will check whether the ATT effect will be sensitive to alternative spec-
ifications of the logit model. Therefore, the debt to GDP ratio (DEBT-GDP)10 
and Neighbour-IT-Adoption11 is added to the logit model; the results for the logit 
model are displayed in the fifth and sixth columns in Table 1. The results show 
that both debt to GDP ratio and Neighbour-IT-Adoption will positively impact on 
the IT adoption decision; however, such effects are observed to be insignificant. 
One more interesting finding, which is not observed by Lin – Ye (2009), is that 
the Pseudo R2 increased to its peak of 0.7 when debt to GDP ratio is included in 
the regression. This suggests that the IT adoption regression model can be im-
proved if the DEBT-GDP factor is included. According to the fifth and sixth rows 
in Tables 3, 4, and 5, most ATT effects remain similar to previous results, which 
is that IT improves the GDP per capita significantly; however, the results for the 
inflation indicators are not obvious. The sole exception is that the ATT effect on 
the inflation level estimated by the kernel matching method is significant at the 
5% level (the coefficient is –20.776, which means that the average CPI is 20.776 
in IT countries compared with that in non-IT nations); however, such effects do 
not hold for all of the other estimation techniques.
In sum, the evidence shows a strong and consistent result after the robustness 
checks. Inflation targeting works well on increasing the GDP per capita for a 
country; however, it appears to be ineffective with respect to lower inflation level 
or inflation volatility. 
10  According to Lin – Ye (2009), when the debt to GDP ratio is added to the model, the estima-
tion results may be different from the model without the debt to the GDP variable. Hence, it 
is important to test the results if the new control variable “debt to GDP” is included in the 
model.
11  The idea for Neighbour-IT-Adoption is that a country may be likely to follow the inflation 
targeting regime if a neighbouring country has previously adopted the IT framework in a given 
year.
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5. DISCUSSIONS ON TESTS OF HETEROGENEITY PROBLEMS 
OF TREATMENT EFFECTS
According to Carare – Stone (2006), countries in one region may be different 
from other economies in other regions because they display variety ranges of 
economic and institutional traits. It is claimed that an inflation targeting policy is 
influenced by such traits. Thus, it is very important to examine the effectiveness 
of the heterogeneity feature on the adoption of inflation targeting within CEE 
countries.
In this section, we examine several possible heterogeneity features using a 
control function regression method. The first feature is to test whether estimated 
propensity scores will impact on the inflation level, which means that if countries 
achieve better preconditions to adopt IT, they will influence the inflation level 
(or the inflation volatility, or the GDP per capita). Next, because of the time lag 
influence of adopting IT on the inflation level, we examine whether the time since 
the country first implemented IT will have an impact on the outcomes of interest. 
Last, a feature of the government fiscal position will be examined with respect to 
its effectiveness on inflation indicators and outputs.
The regression results of the heterogeneity effect are reported in Table 5,12 
using a control function regression approach. The OLS regression of the infla-
tion level on the dummy variable of targeting is displayed in the first column in 
Table 5. This regression result shows that the coefficient of the targeting dummy 
is observed to be positive, which means that a country that adopts the IT regime 
has an impact on the increasing inflation level compared with a non-IT country 
(however, such an effect is not significant). In the second column, I add the con-
trol function of the propensity score, which is derived from the logit model in 
previous baseline test. The coefficient for the targeting dummy variable as well as 
the p-score continue to be observed as non-significant compared with the previ-
ous examination. 
In addition to the p-score heterogeneity feature, an interaction term (difference 
between the propensity score and its average score, as well as the IT dummy 
variable) is examined to verify treatment effects. According to Lin – Ye (2009), 
a significant coefficient for the interaction term is the evidence of heterogeneity. 
The results are reported in the third column of Table 5. Interestingly, the interac-
tion term is observed to be positively correlated with the inflation level; however, 
such an effect is not significant, which means that the treatment effect is not sig-
nificant, and no heterogeneity is found in this case.
12  The heterogeneity problems in the studies for inflation volatility and GDP per capita are similar 
to the study for inflation level. The results are not reported, but can be provided if requested.
390 CHEN WANG
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
Next, it is necessary to investigate whether the time lag after the IT adoption 
will influence the inflation level. The fourth column reports the estimation results 
that the interaction term of IT adoption and time lag since IT adoption do impact 
the nation’s CPI. The coefficient is 3.622 (at the 1% significance level), which 
means that the inflation level will increase as time passes (after IT adoption). 
Last, to investigate the heterogeneity feature with respect to the fiscal charac-
ter, the debt to GDP and its product of the targeting dummy variable are added 
to the model. The result reported in the fifth column shows that the variable debt 
to GDP ratio can positively impact the consumer price index, which means that 
more debt in the GDP ratio will lead to an increase in the inflation level. The 
interaction term between IT and debt to GDP ratio is found to be insignificant to 
the inflation level.
6. CONCLUSION
In this study, I evaluated the average treatment effect of the inflation targeting 
framework in Central and Eastern European countries that adopted these IT re-
gimes through 2010. Based on the propensity matching score method, I found 
that the average treatment effects regarding economic output (GDP per capita) 
are significant and large within inflation targeting countries. Nevertheless, no 
Table 5. Exploring heterogeneity in the treatment effect on level of inflation
1 2 3 4 5
IT 3.401 –0.629 –1.205 10.364
PS 3.934 2.306 0.73 –9.066
IT*(PS-E(PS)) 3.71
IT*TIME 3.622***
DEBTGDP 0.744*
IT*DEBTGDP –0.605
Constant 100.564*** 101.381*** 101.516***  1.841*** 95.589***
No. of observations 206 174 174 57 150
R2 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.34 0.03
Notes: The dependent variable is inflation level. Column 1 reports the model only including “IT” dummy as the 
control variable. Column 2 reports the model including “IT” and “Propensity score” (estimated by the baseline 
model from Section 2) as control variables. Column 3 reports the model including “IT”, “Propensity score”, and 
an interaction term (difference between propensity score and its average score, as well as IT dummy variable) as 
control variables. Column 4 reports the model including “Propensity score” and an interaction term (IT dummy 
as well as Time lag since the country initially adopted IT regime) as control variables. Column 5 reports the IT 
dummy, propensity score, debt to GDP ratio as well as an interaction (IT dummy as well as debt to GDP ratio) 
as control variables. The estimation results are obtained by Ordinary Least Square method which includes the 
constant term. *, **, and *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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significant effects can be obtained with respect to the inflation level and the infla-
tion volatility.
Generally, both the governments and the central banks within the CEE area 
(and possibly in other developing countries) need to evaluate their choice of in-
flation targeting regime by considering the trade-offs between the significant in-
crease in the GDP per capita and the non-significant inflation indicator effects 
during the normal and financial crisis periods.
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